

Message Text

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SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 18,
1975 (SALT TWO-620)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF APRIL 18, 1975.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, APRIL 18, 1975

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL,
THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST PROVIDE FOR A WHOLE COMPLEX OF LIMITATIONS WHICH IN THEIR TOTALITY WOULD ENSURE THE VIABILITY OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS AN OPERATIVE INSTRUMENT FOR LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND CURBING A RACE IN SUCH ARMS.

IT IS PRECISELY FOR THIS REASON THAT THE AIDE-MEMOIRE
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OF DECEMBER 19, 1974, IN ADDITION TO LIMITATIONS ON EXISTING

TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, SETS DOWN THE ACCORD BETWEEN THE SIDES TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT COULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS DURING THE TERM OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING REACHED ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER LAYS THE NECESSARY FOUNDATIONS FOR ADOPTING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT SUCH PROVISIONS AS WOULD NOT PERMIT CIRCUMVENTING OR WEAKENING THE OBLIGATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY DEPLOYMENT DURING THE TERM OF THE NEW AGREEMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH AT PRESENT DO NOT EXIST.

IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT TABLED FEBRUARY 1, 1975 SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS, CONSISTENT WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, ARE CONTAINED IN ARTICLES VIII AND IX. IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE USSR DELEGATION HAS CITED DETAILED CONSIDERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THESE ARTICLES.

CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM, TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE MATTER OF THE SIDES ASSUMING AN OBLIGATION NOT TO EQUIP ANY TYPE OF AIR-PLANE, HELICOPTER OR OTHER AIRCRAFT, WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS OTHER THAN THE BOMBERS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE II, 2(C) OF THE FEBRUARY 1, 1975 DRAFT. SUCH AN OBLIGATION, TOGETHER WITH THE OBLIGATION NOT TO USE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AS NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, AND NOT TO CONVERT THEM FOR THESE PURPOSES, IS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE VIII OF THE SOVIET DRAFT.

THE NECESSITY OF ASSUMING MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS ON THIS SCORE ENSUES FROM THE CONTENT OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE AND IS DICTATED BY THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS THE SIDES HAVE SET FOR THEMSELVES AT THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

AS YOU KNOW, ACCORDING TO PARAGRAPH 2 (A) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, THE SIDES HAVE AGREED THAT WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED

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WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT IN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES.

THIS PROVISION SHOWS THE SERIOUS ATTENTION WITH WHICH THE SIDES VIEW LIMITATIONS ON AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF RESTRAINING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE AGREED DECISION TO

COUNT AS ONE UNIT WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE LIMIT EACH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED RANGE WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM, IS INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SIDES CONSIDER THIS STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLE TO BE SUBJECT TO STRICT LIMITATION, ALONG WITH SUCH TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS.

THE ABOVE OBVIOUSLY DICTATES THE NECESSITY THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT PROVIDE FOR AN OBLIGATION BY THE SIDES WHICH WOULD NOT PERMIT CIRCUMVENTING OR WEAKENING THE LIMITATION ON AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM, THROUGH DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH MISSILES ON OTHER AIRCRAFT. THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE FEBRUARY 1 DRAFT ARE CONSISTENT WITH PRECISELY THIS TASK.

IN THE MARCH 10, 1975 STATEMENT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION IT WAS ALLEGED THAT THIS DRAFT, IN PROVIDING FOR A BAN ON EQUIPPING AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES "GOES BEYOND THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING." WE HAVE ALREADY EMPHASIZED AND WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT AGAIN THAT THE SITUATION IS EXACTLY THE OTHER WAY AROUND. THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES UNDER ARTICLE VIII OF THE SOVIET DRAFT SERVE THE OBJECTIVES OF EMBODYING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT THE CONTENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. DURING DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION AT PLENARY MEETINGS AND ELSEWHERE NO ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD SUBSTANTIATE ANOTHER VIEW THAT WERE THE LEAST BIT CONVINCING WERE HEARD. AND, THIS IS NATURAL: THE NEED FOR THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE VIII OF THE SOVIET DRAFT IS DICTATED BY THE LOGIC OF REALITY.

LIMITING AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM DOES NOT AT
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ALL MEAN THAT IT IS ADVISABLE OR POSSIBLE TO LEAVE OPEN CHANNELS FOR EQUIPPING OTHER AIRCRAFT WITH SUCH MISSILES. THE CLEAR NECESSITY OF UNAMBIGUOUSLY LAYING DOWN IN THE NEW AGREEMENT AN OBLIGATION FOR THE SIDES TO REFRAIN FROM EQUIPPING AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS FOLLOWS FROM BOTH THE SUBSTANCE AND THE LETTER OF THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN THE DELEGATIONS.

DEPLOYMENT OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS ON OTHER AIRCRAFT WOULD IN ESSENCE REPRESENT THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW, PRESENTLY NOT YET EXISTING, BUT, IN THE ABSENCE OF APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE APHERE FOR COMPETITION IN THE BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE LARGE NUMBERS AND DIVERSITY OF EXISTING AIRCRAFT, SUCH A TURN OF EVENTS WOULD RESULT IN EXPANDING

THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ON A SCALE THAT IS HARD TO FORESEE AT PRESENT. THE USE OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AS STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES AND THEIR CONVERSION FOR THESE PURPOSES COULD ALSO LEAD TO THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW CATEGORY OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IF THE AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED WERE TO LEAVE SUCH A POSSIBILITY UNBLOCKED.

IS IT FOR THE SAKE OF SUCH A GOAL THAT OUR NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONDUCTED? WOULD SUCH A SITUATION REALLY BE CONSISTENT WITH THE RESTRAINT THE PARTIES AGREED AMONG THEMSELVES TO EXERCISE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER, HAVING RECORDED OBLIGATIONS TO THAT EFFECT IN DOCUMENTS SIGNED AT THE HIGHEST STATE LEVEL?

CLEARLY NOT.

THE ABSENCE OF THE PROPOSED LIMITATIONS COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE AGREED EFFORTS OF OUR STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE FURTHER LIMITATION AND POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, AND WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ONE OF THE MAIN GOALS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS TO TAKE STEPS TOWARD AVERTING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT IN TAKING THE DECISION TO ESTABLISH LIMITATIONS ON AIR-TO-SURFACE
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MISSILES OF ALL TYPES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM, A CHANNEL MUST NOT BE LEFT OPEN FOR DEPLOYING SUCH MISSILES ON OTHER AIRCRAFT, THEREBY LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING THE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST ALSO CONTAIN A PROVISION PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF USING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AS NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES OR CONVERTING THEM TO SUCH USE.

IN VIEW OF THE TASK OF WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE JOINT DRAFT OF THE AGREEMENT, AND GUIDED BY THE DESIRE OF ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED THEREIN, THE USSR DELEGATION REAFFIRMS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO INCLUDE IN THE NEW AGREEMENT THE OBLIGATIONS FORMULATED IN ARTICLE VIII OF THE SOVIET DRAFT. UNQUOTE
JOHNSON

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